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Articles
H. Allan Leal, O.C., Q.C.* Federal State Clauses and
the Conventions of The Hague
Conference on Private
International Law
Dean Read would have been pleased, I believe, with this year's
events since Canada has ratified The Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction.' This is a first for Canada
in its participation in The Hague Conference on Private
International Law. Dean Read worked hard and effectively to
promote Canada's participation in that Conference and he was the
Atlantic regional representative on the Canadian delegation to the
first plenary session attended by Canadian delegates in 1968. I had
the honour to work with him at that time and to be closely associated
with him for many years in the field of legal education and the work
of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, as it is now called. For
these reasons, and others, it is a'privilege to be here on yet another
occasion devoted to the greening of his memory. We share still with
Mrs. Read a real sense of loss but rejoice that his work lives on. Si
monumentum requiris, circumspice - if it is a monument you seek,
look about you.
I have chosen as the subject for this year's discourse, "Federal
State Clauses and the Conventions of The Hague Conference on
Private International Law." Much of the discussion will be
relevant, however, to treaties and conventions emanating from other
international agencies such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT. Our
discussions will focus on the place where public international law,
*This article contains the text of the Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture delivered at
Dalhousie Law School, September 19, 1983. The author is the Vice Chairman of
the Ontario Law Reform Commission and was a member of the Canadian
delegation at the plenary sessions of The Hague Conference on Private
International Law in 1968, 1972 and 1976 and Chief of the Canadian delegation at
the plenary session in 1980. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable
research assistance in the preparation of this article received from R.S.G. Chester
of the Ontario Bar, and John Wilson, 1983 summer research assistant at the Ontario
Law Reform Commission.
1. This Convention concluded at The Hague on October 25, 1980 has not yet come
into force. It was ratified by Canada on June 2, 1983.
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private international law, and constitutional law meet. I trust that
they will be no less acceptable for that reason in this forum devoted
primarily to private international law matters. The issues are more
acute with respect to The Hague Conference since its conventions
deal essentially with the resolution of conflicts in private law
matters.
The crux of the matter is that due to the particular, some would
say peculiar, nature of the Canadian Constitution the treaty-making
and treaty-implementing power in Canada is divided, as a
jurisdictional matter, amongst the federal and provincial executive
and legislative bodies. 2 A substantial number of international
conventions deal with subject matters which, from the treaty-
implementation point of view, fall domestically within the
legislative competence of the provincial legislatures. Consequently
in the formulation stage the provincial governments ought to, and in
the implementation stage the provincial governments must, be
involved in the process. Without an acceptable federal state clause,
Canada, in these circumstances, is powerless to enter into
international conventions without the approval of all ten provinces.
At best this may result in inordinate delay and, at worst,
impossibility. A properly formulated federal state clause, on the
other hand, allows Canada to ratify international conventions with
respect to one or more of the provinces and to alter the declaration
from time to time as more provinces desire to be brought within the
ambit of the convention. In illustration of this, Canada, on June 2,
1983 ratified The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction with respect to the provinces of
Ontario, New Brunswick, British Columbia and Manitoba. When it
comes into force the Convention will apply only between those
provinces and the contracting states. Needless to say, implementing
legislation has already been enacted in all four provinces, adopting a
draft act formulated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada.
In Canada, as in the United States, the treaty-making power
reposes in the federal government. This, however, appears to be the
end of the similarity between the two countries.
2. See G. L. Morris, The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian Dilemma (1967), 45
Can. Bar Rev. 478.
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Treaty-Making Power in the United States
The framers of the American Constitution sought to establish a
federal government with specific and limited enumerated powers.
On the other hand, in Canada, the Fathers of Confederation sought a
strong federal government with limited legislative competence in
the provinces. With the treaty-making power the opposites of these
objectives have evolved through the cases. In the United States the
federal power to make treaties has evolved with great strength and
can override state law and congressional acts. On the other hand, in
Canada, the treaty power is limited with no ability in itself to affect
the distribution of legislative power.
The American Constitution grants to the President the power to
make treaties subject to Senate approval. This treaty-making power
is contained in Article II, section 2, of the Constitution which
provides:
The President. . .shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur ...
Under this provision, treaties are generally negotiated by the
representatives of the executive who will return the proposed treaty
to the President when fully negotiated. The President then submits
the treaty to the Senate for approval. Normally after review by the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senate can approve or
reject the treaty as negotiated by the executive. That is, the Senate
has no constitutional power to approve a treaty subject to
reservations. In effect, however, such a power is exercised by the
Senate through withholding approval subject to changes in the treaty
being made. When this occurs further negotiation by the executive
will normally be required. 3 Even after Senate approval, however,
the President is free not to conclude the treaty and at this stage the
Senate is functus.
4
3. This is what occurred during the negotiations between Canada and The United
States regarding the east coast fishery. An agreement was reached by the
negotiators of each country but the Senate refused approval unless certain changes
were made to favour American fishermen. Upon return to the negotiating table the
Canadian delegates could not ageee to the amendments and therefore Senate
approval was not obtained and no treaty resulted. See, generally, L. Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, N.Y., Foundation Press, 1972),
133; and M. J. Glennon, Senate Role in Treaty Ratification (1983), 77 Am. J. Int.
L. 257; M. J. Glennon, Treaty Process Reform: saving constitutionalism without
destroying diplomacy (1983), 52 U. Cinn. L.R. 84.
4. Henkin, op. cit. at 136.
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It is important to point out that the Senate in the United States can
be an important champion of states' rights against federal powers
for the reason that the Senate is composed of Senators from each
state, directly chosen by the people of the state, voting as one
electorate. The Australian elected Senate is similarly constituted.
There are lessons to be learned here in any changes proposed for a
Canadian upper house.
The legal status of treaties in the United States is determined by
Article VI, clause 2, of the Constitution which provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding.
The leading case on the capacity of the federal government to
trench upon state legislative competence by exercise of the
treaty-making power is Missouri v. Holland5 decided in 1920. That
case involved the treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom concerning migratory birds in Canada and the United
States. There was no question that the regulation of hunting within a
state was outside federal competence and previous attempts by
Congress to legislate in this area without the benefit of a treaty had
been held unconstitutional. The State of Missouri attacked the
federal legislation implementing the treaty on the ground that the
treaty-making power was limited to areas within federal legislative
competence and since the regulation of intra state hunting was not
delegated to the federal government in the Constitution, federal
legislative action was precluded by the Tenth Amendment. You will
recall that the Tenth Amendment is the opposite of the Canadian
residual power clause in that it provides that everything which is not
expressly delegated to the federal government in the Constitution
remains within state competence.
The Court held that regardless of whether a matter was otherwise
within state competence the entry into an international agreement
removed the matter into the competence of the federal government.
Thus, while a treaty must accord with the Constitution of the United
States, it need not respect the division of legislative competence.
5. (1920), 252 U.S. 416.
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To round out the picture a word must be said about international
executive agreements. By the use of these agreements the President
has largely been able to avoid Senate approval. Under such a device
the executive merely enters into an agreement with a foreign power
which in international law becomes binding regardless of Senate
approval. In U.S. v. Belmont6 in 1937 and U.S. v. Pink7 in
1942, these agreements were held to override state law. In U.S. v.
Capps8 in 1953, however, these internal executive agreements were
held not to override laws passed by Congress. The rule is that
treaties can intrude on congressional powers unless a congressional
act is specifically required or Congress has already acted in a
manner inconsistent with the treaty. In this latter case, however, the
result can be avoided if Senate approval is obtained.
To summarize the American position, treaties which are made by
and with the consent of the Senate are undoubtedly supreme law and
may override state law and previous acts of Congress. Executive
agreements may override state law, but have only limited capacity
to override the powers of Congress. Self-executing agreements can
affect congressional competence while those requiring legislation
cannot.
Treaty-Making Power in Canada
The Canadian position is markedly different from the United States.
At the time of the original Confederation conferences, Canada did
not possess international personality and therefore the British North
America Act, 1867 did not contemplate the time when Canada
would possess such capacity on attaining the status of an
independent sovereign state. As a result, the extent of the power of
the federal government to enter into treaties affecting provincial
competence has been left to the courts for delineation. The resulting
judicial analysis, at least to this date, has left the treaty-making
power subject to the distribution of legislative power contained in
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the B.N.A.
Act, 1867 is now called.
6. (1937), 301 U.S. 324.
7. (1942), 315 U.S. 203; noted (1948) 48 Col. L.R. 890. See also U.S. v.
Curtis-Wright (1936), 299 U.S. 304; Guaranty Trust v. U.S. (1938), 304 U.S.
126.
8. (1953), 204 F. 2d 655 (C.A. 4 Circ.).
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This limitation precludes the federal government from concluding
treaties which trench upon provincial competence and at the same
time, as the provinces do not possess international personality, they
are unable to conclude international treaties concerned with such
areas. Canada's ability to participate fully in the international arena
is impaired to the extent that, in the absence of federal-provincial
accord, there is an inability to conclude treaties dealing with
significant portions of the economic, social, political and legal
spectrum.
In 1867 the power to effect international agreements for all the
Dominions under the Crown resided in Westminster and the
Confederation conferences did not presume to suggest that any such
power should be given to Canada. Thus the Constitution Act, 1867
dealt only with British Empire treaties, that is, agreements entered
into by the United Kingdom on behalf of the Dominions. With
respect to such treaties a supremacy clause was included in the
Constitution Act, 1867. Section 132 of that Act provides:
The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers
necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or
of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards
Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire
and such Foreign Countries.
This clause conferred on the federal government the power to trench
upon provincial areas of competence so long as the treaty could be
characterized as an "Empire treaty". This was made clear in R. v.
Stuart9 in 1924 where the defendant had been charged under the
federal Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1917 which implemented
the treaty of the same name entered into by the United Kingdom on
behalf of Canada.
The defence was raised, as in Missouri v. Holland'° in the United
States, that the regulation of hunting was a matter of provincial
competence which could not be usurped by the federal government.
This argument was rejected because of the precise wording of
section 132 and since an Empire treaty was at issue the federal
government had full competence to implement the treaty notwith-
standing the fact that its contents were otherwise an area of
provincial concern. Dennistoun J.A. stated:
9. [1924] 3 W.W.R. 648; 34 Man. R. 509; 43 C.C.C. 108; [1925] 1 D.L.R. 12
(Man. C.A.).
10. See, supra, fn. 5.
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Section 132 must be construed as conferring powers which will
enable the Dominion to keep full faith with the United States of
America and to take all necessary measures to prevent the
indiscriminate slaughter of migratory birds. I
An identical result occurred in Attorney-General for British
Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada12 in 1924 involving
legislation validating provincial Orders-in-Council which prohibited
the employment of Japanese or Chinese in mines in British
Columbia. These orders were in direct conflict with a treaty entered
into by Great Britain on behalf of the Dominions with Japan and
specifically with Canadian federal legislation, the Japanese Treaty
Act, S.C. 1913, c. 27, which guaranteed the right of British
subjects and Japanese nationals to pursue a living in the territory of
the signatories. Notwithstanding the fact that the employment
contracts were otherwise within the area of provincial competence,
the Privy Council held that such competence must cede to the terms
of the treaty, in accordance with the provisions of section 132.
In the period following World War I, from the independent
signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to the Statute of
Westminster in 1931, Canada developed its own international
personality and with it the power to enter into international
agreements without the intervention of Westminster. The question
naturally arose concerning the status of such agreements when they
purported to deal with matters within provincial competence.
The first two cases dealing with Canada's new sovereignty were
inconclusive as to the extent of the treaty power. In Re Regulation
and Control of Aeronautics in Canada13 in 1931 the treaty in
question was signed by Canada in its own right but was also ratified
by Westminster on behalf of the Empire. The Privy Council held
that the treaty could affect provincial competence on two grounds.
First, it was held that aeronautics were not within the class of
subjects enumerated in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act,
1867 and therefore within federal legislative competence under the
residual power. Second, the Board expressed the view that section
132 governed this treaty and, therefore, the division of powers was
largely irrelevant.
11. Supra, fn. 9 at 15.
12. [1924] A.C. 203 (P.C.).
13. [19323A.C. 54 (P.C.).
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A similar situation arose in Re Regulation and Control of Radio
Communication in Canada1 4 in 1932, where the treaty was not
signed by the United Kingdom but rather assent was given to the
signing of the treaty by the Dominions individually. On these facts,
the provinces submitted that the provisions of section 132 did not
govern and provincial competence must be respected. The Privy
Council did not respond directly to this argument, holding that radio
communications, like aeronautics, were within federal competence
under the residual clause and, therefore, a matter solely of federal
legislative competence. It was suggested by Viscount Dunedin,
however, that all matters of international agreement were within the
residual clause and, therefore, within federal competence. Viscount
Dunedin stated:
It is Canada as a whole which is amenable to the other powers for
the proper carrying out of the convention; and to prevent
individuals in Canada infringing the stipulations of the
convention it is necessary that the Dominion should pass
legislation which would apply to all the dwellers in Canada. 1
5
This reasoning, however, which would bring the federal
competence with respect to treaty implementation of international
agreement within the residual power of the Constitution Act, 1867
was rejected by the Privy Council in the Attorney-General for
Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario (Labour Conventions) 16 in
1937. This case involved a reference to determine the capacity of
the federal government to enter into three treaties relating to
employment contracts. 17 The federal government argued that the
impugned implementing legislation was valid under the provisions
of section 132 or alternatively under a treaty power within the
residual clause. Both arguments were rejected. The Board
summarily dismissed the submissions with respect to section 132
holding that this was not an Empire treaty but rather one entered into
by Canada in its new status as an international person. The Board
then implicitly rejected the argument that the power was within the
residual clause. The Board reasoned that as a general treaty-making
power was not expressly enumerated in the Act, the real question
14. [1932]A.C. 304 (P.C.).
15. Ibid., 313. Lord Sankey L.C. made a similar comment in Re Aeronautics,
supra, fn. 13 at 77.
16. [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
17. The implementing legislation was the Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings
Act, the Minimum Wages Act and the Limitation of Hours of Work Act.
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was not who had the power to enter into treaties but rather who had
the power to pass the implementing legislation. The Board held that
if the enacting legislation, apart from the treaty, was within
provincial competence then only the province could pass the
requisite legislation. To hold otherwise, according to Lord Atkin,
would be to grant the federal government greater power than
specifically contemplated by the British North America Act.
The decision in the Labour Conventions case has been roundly
criticized by constitutional lawyers like Frank Scott and Peter Hogg
who have argued that the modern treaty power could justifiably be
found in section 132.18 This was precisely the argument rejected by
three members of the Supreme Court of Canada, with whom the
Board agreed.19 It is difficult to accept the "living tree" principle
advocated by Scott and Hogg in view of the clear wording of section
132. The genus of the sapling determines the essential nature of the
mature tree.
In dealing with the second argument the Board having drawn the
obvious distinction between treaty-making and treaty-implementing
rested their reasons solely on the distribution of legislative power
under sections 91 and 92. Lord Atkin stated it in this way:
If, therefore, s. 132 is out of the way, the validity of the
legislation [i.e. treaty-implementation] can only depend upon ss.
91 and 92. Now it had to be admitted that normally this
legislation came within the classes of subjects by s. 92 assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces, namely -
property and civil rights in the Province. This was in fact
expressly decided in respect of these same conventions by the
Supreme Court in 1925. How, then, can the legislation be within
the legislative powers given by s. 91 to the Dominion
Parliament? It is not within the enumerated classes of subjects in
s. 91: and it appears to be expressly excluded from the general
powers given by the first words of the section.
For the purposes of ss. 91 and 92, i.e. the distribution of
legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provinces,
there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The
distribution is based on classes of subjects; and as a treaty deals
with a particular class of subjects so will the legislative power of
performing it be ascertained. No one can doubt that this
18. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 190 et seq.; Scott, Labour Conventions
Case: Lord Wright's Undisclosed Dissent?, (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 114.
19. [1936] S.C.R. 461, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 673. Duff C.J.C., Davis and Kerwin JJ.
held the legislation intra vires. Rinfret, Cannon and Crocket JJ. held it ultra vires.
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distribution is one of the most essential conditions, probably the
most essential condition, in the inter-provincial compact to which
the British North America Act gives effect. . . . It would be
remarkable that while the Dominion could not initiate legislation,
however desirable, which affected civil rights in the Provinces,
yet its Government not responsible to the Provinces nor
controlled by Provincial Parliaments need only agree with a
foreign country to enact such legislation, and its Parliament
would be forthwith clothed with authority to affect Provincial
rights to the full extent of such agreement. Such a result would
appear to undermine the constitutional safeguards of Provincial
constitutional autonomy.
It follows from what has been said that no further legislative
competence is obtained by the Dominion from its accession to
international status, and the consequent increase in the scope of
its executive functions. . . . There is no existing constitutional
ground for stretching the competence of the Dominion Parliament
so that it becomes enlarged to keep pace with enlarged functions
of the Dominion executive. If the new functions affect the
classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92 legislation to support the
new functions is in the competence of the Provincial Legislatures
only. If they do not, the competence of the Dominion Legislature
is declared by s. 91 and existed ab origine. In other words, the
Dominion cannot, merely by making promises to foreign
countries, clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with
the constitution which gave it birth.
It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that
Canada is incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty
obligations. In totality of legislative powers, Dominion and
Provincial together, she is fully equipped. But the legislative
powers remain distributed, and if in the exercise of her new
functions derived from her new international status Canada incurs
obligations they must, so far as legislation be concerned, when
they deal with Provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by the
totality of powers, in other words by co-operation between the
Dominion and the Provinces. While the ship of state now sails on
larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the
watertight compartments which are an essential part of her
original structure.2
0
Despite this clear language there remains support in some
quarters for a revisitation of the Labour Conventions case. This is
based on the argument that the federal government is the only
international person within Canada and to deny full treaty-making
20. [1937] A.C. 326, 350 et seq.
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and treaty-implementing power to the federal government com-
promises Canadian sovereignty, that the ship of state referred to by
Lord Atkin is becalmed or dead in the water.
Some indication has been given by the Supreme Court of Canada
of its willingness to reconsider the Labour Conventions case; though
the matter is so charged politically that it was thought desirable to
keep it off the agenda or not to include it in the twelve items which
were the subject of the most recent round of constitutional
negotiations. There is no evidence that it was ever considered for
inclusion. The judges would thus be asked to intervene where
politicans fear to tread in this volatile political arena.
In Johannesson v. West St. Paul21 in 1951 a conflict arose
between a municipal by-law and Canada's obligation under the
Convention on International Civil Aviation entered into by Canada
in 1944. The court held the treaty to be paramount on the basis that
aeronautics was within the residual clause and thus exclusively
federal and therefore the Labour Conventions case did not impede
the exercise of plenary federal legislative jurisdiction. The case
arguably goes beyond this, however, and potentially could support a
submission that the treaty-making power itself is within the residual
clause. This argument arises due to the holding that matters of
national interest and importance are federal and since treaties in
general are concerned with matters of national interest they are
within federal competence.
A more direct attack on the principle of the Labour Conventions
case may be the result of the decision in Re Offshore Minerals22 in
1967. In that case the court partially based its holding that Canada
had jurisdiction over the territorial sea on the west coast on the fact
that it was Canada and not British Columbia which was answerable
in international law for obligations entered into with respect to that
sea. This would appear to give some support for the argument that
whenever Canada is subject to international obligations that the
content of these obligations become matters of federal competence.
Again this is precisely what Lord Atkin said the federal government
could not do, i.e., to change the distribution of legislative power
simply by assuming responsibility for the discharge of international
obligations. Obviously, however, there is a difference between
21. [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292.
22. [1967] S.C.R. 792.
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international obligations undertaken voluntarily, as in treaties, and
those that result from international law without treaty.
In a more recent case the Supreme Court has reiterated the
possibility that the Labour Conventions case will be reviewed. In
MacDonald v. Vapor Canada2 3 in 1976 the federal government
attempted to justify a section of the Trade Marks Act, inter alia, on
the basis that it was required to fulfill Canada's obligations under
international convention. The Court rejected this argument being
unable to find that the convention in question required the
enactment of the impugned provision. In the course of his reasons
for judgment, concurred in by Spence, Pigeon, Dickson and Beetz,
JJ., the Chief Justice referred to other cases and other judicial
authority where the decision in the Labour Conventions case was
doubted and then added:
Although the foregoing references would support a reconsidera-
tion of the Labour Conventions case, I find it unnecessary to do
that here because, assuming that it was open to Parliament to pass
legislation in implementation of an international obligation by
Canada under a treaty or Convention (being legislation which it
[sic] would be otherwise beyond its competence), I am of the
opinion that it cannot be said that. . . [the section in the instant
case] was enacted on that basis.
24
Even accepting the uncertain fact that the future may bring
substantial change, we are required for the present to negotiate,
formulate and implement treaties in accordance with the constitu-
tional principles, some would say undue strictures, established by
the Labour Conventions case. We are also required to adhere to the
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
which Canada acceded in October 1970 and which came into force
after ratification by the thirty-fifth state on January 27, 1980.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The Convention does not explicitly deal with the issue of federal
state clauses. However, several articles do have some relevance to
that issue. Article 6 deals with capacity to enter into treaties and
enacts customary international law as follows:
Every state possesses capacity to conclude treaties. The use of the
word "state" relates to the international concept of a state meaning
23. [1977)2 S.C.R. 134.
24. Ibid., 169.
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a sovereign unit with defined territory, population and some
semblance of independent internal political control. When applied
to federal states, the concept of sovereignty will yield international
recognition to the central government thus resulting in an incapacity
in the component units to conclude treaties.
In earlier drafts of the Vienna Convention an attempt was made to
give members of a federal state a limited capacity to conclude
treaties. As originally drafted article 6 contained the following
provisions:
States members of a federal union may possess a capacity to
conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal
constitution and within the limits there laid down.
Even this would not have been helpful to Canada since it has not
been admitted by the federal government that such capacity exists in
the provinces under our federal constitution. That is not to say that
the argument has not been made, particularly by the Province of
Quebec, that such power does exist in matters falling within the
areas of provincial legislative competence.
But the wording of the draft Vienna Convention caused
difficulties since a technical interpretation of the clause would allow
a member of a federal state to enter into treaties only when it was a
state in its own right in terms of international law. 25 This, however,
appears not to have been the intention of the draftsmen, nor was it
appreciated by the diplomatic conference convened to settle the
terms of the treaty. Despite the confusion concerning the provision
and the concern of some delegates that it represented a troublesome
intrusion into the internal constitutional arrangements of federal
states, the provision was adopted by the first session. This position
was, however, reversed at the second session and the provision was
deleted. 26
For our present purposes the remaining three relevant articles of
the Vienna Convention are as follows:
Art. 27. A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is
without prejudice to article 46.
Art. 29. Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in
respect of its entire territory.
25. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official' Records, 1st Session,
A/Conf. 39/11, Eleventh Meeting, 59 et seq.
26. Ibid., Second Session, A/Conf. 39/11, Add. 1, 6et seq.
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Art 46. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision
of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as
invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
By the Vienna Convention then a treaty entered into by the
federal government is presumed to bind the entire country unless a
different intention is expressed or can be implied. One assumes that
the accession to the Vienna Convention itself was a matter of federal/
provincial accord. Otherwise one gets trapped in the circulus
inextricabilis. The division of powers would not provide a defence
to an action on the treaty dealing with subject matter beyond the
legislative competence of the federal government.
Article 29 is particularly relevant to the Canadian position in that
it allows that the application of a treaty may be limited territorially if
the treaty so provides. Conversely, in the absence of a permitted and
declared territorial limitation the treaty applies to its entire territory.
This points up the dire necessity of an acceptable federal state clause
tailor-made for the Canadian situation. Such a clause was fashioned
at the Twelfth Session of The Hague Conference in 1972 and has
been used in The Hague conventions and other international treaties
since that date.
The Federal State Clause
Although there exists a fairly large body of literature concerning the
federal state clause most of it was written prior to 1972 and
accordingly is not helpful on developments since that date. In this
category is Ivan Bernier's treatise, "International Legal Aspects of
Federalism." 27 In his analysis of federal state clauses Bernier states
that they must be distinguished from territorial application clauses.
The latter, also called the colonial clause, stipulates that either a
treaty will not apply to colonies and dependencies unless the
signatory state notifies its intention to the contrary or that it will
apply to such territories unless they are excluded by specific
negotiation. Bernier then continues:
Federal state clauses, on the other hand, limit, or otherwise
affect, the obligations of the signatory federal state with respect
to subject matters falling within the jurisdiction of its member
states. Thus, the territorial application clause is concerned with
27. Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism, 1973.
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the problem of the inclusion or exclusion of non-metropolitan
areas in the sphere of application of the treaty; whereas the
federal state clause takes into consideration the difficulty of
applying to the component parts of a federation an international
instrument that deals wholly or in part with subject matters within
their exclusive field of jurisdiction. One clause is jurisdictional,
the other territorial, and it is unsafe to lump the two together as
though they were one. 28
This type of classification was defensible on the then state of the
art but a lot has happened since Bernier wrote. Although up to now I
have referred to the federal state clause as if there were only one, I
think it preferable to say that present rationalization would indicate
there are a number of substantially different federal state clauses
which may be classified in two main categories. The first group
comprises the federal state ratification or accession clause which
really is involved with both territoriality and jurisdiction and the
second group is the federal state interpretation clauses which vary
with the subject matter of the treaty or convention and are,
therefore, in the private law field infinitely various.
The Federal State Ratification Clause
The so-called colonial clause has been contained in The Hague
conventions since time immemorial. Selecting one at random it
appears in the following form in the most recent Hague Convention
on International Access to Justice, formulated at the Fourteenth
Session, October 25, 1980:
Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, declare that the Convention shall extend to
all the territories for the international relations of which it is
responsible, or to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall
take effect at the time the Convention enters into force for that
State.29
As Bernier points out such a provision has no application to a
federal state which is made up of member states, without any
external territories 30 and certainly not to a federal state such as
Canada with division of legislative competence between the federal
authority and the constituent provincial units depending on the
28. Ibid., 172.
29. Collection of Conventions, The Hague Conference on Private International
Law, XXIX, Convention on International Access to Justice, Article 33, 299.
30. Bernier, op. cit., 173.
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subject matter of the convention. This lacuna led to a review of the
situation at The Hague Conference since it was involved in
multilateral conventions concerning federal states and unitary states
alike. Indeed, as the development progressed there has been a
realization that many more states are federal in nature for some
important purposes of these conventions than was originally
envisaged and there has been a proliferation of different types of the
federal state clause to deal with the problem as changing subject
matter dictates.
As indicated in my remarks at the outset of this address, Canada
participated in The Hague Conference for the first time in 1968. The
members of the delegation attending the Eleventh Session in
October of that year were involved in the formulation of
Conventions on the Recognition of Divorce and Legal Separation,
the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, and on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. Although not
entirely satisfactory from the Canadian point of view these
Conventions did attempt to go beyond the classical colonial clause
and deal with a federal state clause from the standpoint of
jurisdiction. The Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic
Accidents provided in Article 14 as follows:
A State having a non-unified legal system may, at the time of
signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention
shall extend to all its legal systems or to one or more of them, and
may modify its declaration at any time thereafter by making a
new declaration.
This was closer to Canadian aspirations but not ideal because of
the possible interpretation that the reference was to the civil law and
common law systems and not jurisdictional territorial units giving
rise to ten legal systems. The Divorce Convention of the same year
caused no major concern for Canada because, in divorce, Canada
has a unified legal system since divorce is a federal head of
jurisdiction and legal separation was not a construct known to the
law in several provinces. The Divorce Convention, however, did
contain a federal state clause identical in terms to that in the Traffic
Accidents Convention. It was inserted at the request of Israel
because in the matter of divorce Israel, though politically a unitary
state, does have a separate system of laws with respect to divorce of
Jewish nationals and that of Arab nationals.
At the Twelfth Session of The Hague Conference the matter of
appropriate federal state clauses arose again in the context of three
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new conventions on the International Administration of the Estates
of Deceased Persons, on the Law Applicable to Products Liability,
and on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to
Maintenance Obligations. The amended version of the federal state
clause approved by that Session was negotiated, drafted and
presented by D. S. Maxwell, Q.C., Deputy Minister of Justice,
Canada and Chief of the Canadian delegation, and Mr. P.W.
Amram, a Washington international law attorney and acting chief of
the American delegation, with the assistance of advisors from their
respective delegations. 31 As approved by the Conference, Article
14 of the Convention on Products Liability reads as follows:
If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units which have
their own rules of law in respect of products liability, it may, at
the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to all its
territorial units or only to one or more of them, and may modify
its declaration by submitting another declaration at any time.
The proper solution was attained at last not only for Canada but
other federal systems like the United States with similar political, if
not entirely legal, problems of constitutional ordering. It will be
noted that this clause identifies accurately the source of the differing
legal systems to which the convention must give cognizance if the
jurisdictional problem is to be resolved in a meaningful way. It
enables Canada to ratify treaties involving provincial legislative
jurisdiction without the unanimous consent of all provinces and to
declare the convention non-applicable to those provinces who do
not consent. It gives full force and effect to the treaty-making power
in the federal government and the treaty-implementing power to the
provincial governments in matters where the provincial legislatures
have legislative competence.
It should be pointed out that these conventions also contain the
classical colonial clause, i.e. the territorial application clause
referred to by Bernier. The new clause can be said to be
jurisdictional but it is jurisdictional in the sense that it is based on
the existence of territorial units having legislative competence and
31. Conf&ence de La Haye de droit international priv6, Actes et Documents de la
Douzi~me session, Tome I Matieres diverses, Document de travail No. 5 - Note
of the Canadian delegation, 1-91; Document de travial No. 9 - Joint Proposal of
the United States and Canada for a standard model of 'Federal State' Clauses,
1-107; Proces-verbal No. 4, 1-108-110.
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thus creating the fact of multiple legal systems in one state in the
particular subject matter being dealt with in the convention.
What may be described as the 1972 version of the federal state
clause has appeared in all subsequent Hague Conventions and has
been adopted in its precise terms in the UNIDROIT Convention on
the Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will at
Washington in 1973, the United Nations Convention on the
Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods at New York in
1974, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods at Vienna in 1980, and in the recent
conventions of the Organization of American States resulting from
its International Conferences on Private International Law (CIDIP/I
and II) in 1975 and 1980, even though Canada is not yet a member
of the O.A.S. Thus it can be said that the clause has gained
widespread international recognition.
It is all the more distressing to record here that its acceptance has
not been unanimous. Unhappily the chief opponent is one of our
sister Commonwealth countries, Australia. The Australian concerns
were expressed forcefully as early as 1972 at The Hague, reached
the level of diplomatic exchanges at the time of the Washington
Conference in 1973 and the New York Conference in 1974, and
escalated to such proportions at The Hague in 1980 that the
Australians insisted on the insertion of a federal state clause that
would reserve their position on treaty-making power. This was not
their preferred position. They would have been happier with the
removal, or, at least, modification of the 1972 federal state clause.
It appears as Article 40 of the 1980 Hague Convention on Child
Abduction again in these terms:
If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which
different systems of law are applicable in relation to matters dealt
with in this Convention, it may at the time of signature,
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession declare that this
Convention shall extend to all its territorial units or only to one or
more of them and may modify this declaration by submitting
another declaration at any time.
The organic statute of the Australian constitution is not specific
on the treaty-making power. Presumably the current powers derive
from public international law principles applicable to a state having
international personality as a sovereign country. This was not true
of the colonies which united to form the Commonwealth in 1900.
There is not even reference to Empire treaties as in section 132 of
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the Constitution Act, 1867. Perhaps the winds of change which led
to independent sovereign status for the Dominions after World War
I were already causing reflection in 1900 and it was thought
politically desirable not to make direct reference to the treaty power.
Whatever the reason, the only direct reference to treaties in the
Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia is contained in
section 75(i) which grants original jurisdiction to the High Court in
all matters arising under any treaty. There is currently under
consideration in Australia a constitutional amendment which would
allow the High Court to give advisory opinions. A government
standing committee on constitutional reform has recommended the
insertion of a new section 77A of a somewhat elaborate nature
enabling the High Court to give advisory opinions on a large range
of matters including the Commonwealth and state acts, proposed
enactments and "any question of law arising under or with respect
to any treaty, including any question of law relating to the
implementation of any treaty, being a question that, by reason of
circumstances existing at the time of the reference, the Governor-
General in Council is of opinion has arisen or is reasonably likely to
arise.' '32
The reasons for the Australian federal state confrontation may be
found in the general provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, 1900. Sections 5, 51, 107, 108 and 109 contain
the seeds for differences and discord in the exercise of legislative
power with respect to the implementation of treaties. Section 5 is
the paramountcy or supremacy clause in favour of the federal
Parliament and reads as follows:
This Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth under the Constitution, shall be binding on the
courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the
Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any
State; ....
Conversely the political leverage granted to the States under the
Constitution flows from sections 107, 108 and 109 which read as
follows:
107. Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has
become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution
exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or
withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the
32. (1983), 57 A.L.J. 127 at 128.
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establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or
establishment of the State, as the case may be.
108. Every law in force in a Colony which has or becomes a
State, and relating to any matter within the powers of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this
Constitution, continue in force in the State; and, until provision is
made in that behalf by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the
Parliament of the State shall have such powers of alteration or
repeal in respect of any such law as the Parliament of the Colony
had until the Colony became a State.
109. When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to
the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
Under the Constitution the powers of the Commonwealth
Parliament are contained in the provisions of section 51. The
relevant provision for present purposes reads as follows:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to:-
(XXIX.) External affairs:....
It will be noted that section 51 (XXIX) makes reference to "external
affairs" and not to "treaties". The issue is whether the reach of this
federal power is such as to enable the Commonwealth Parliament to
legislate with a view to implementing a treaty and in doing so
override state law.
These provisions cover such a welter of constitutionally
justiciable facts that there is small wonder that neither the
Commonwealth nor the State authorities should have been disposed
to agree to any precise wording in international agreements which
might have had profound significance in the resolution of these
constitutional issues at a time when those issues were being brought
before the Australian courts. No one would deny the reality of these
concerns but what is being suggested is that their nature is such that
they must be resolved at home. The Australian federal authorities
appear to view the precise wording of the 1972 version of the
federal state clause as having the potential of circumscribing the
treaty-making power of the federal government. The state
authorities, on the other hand, or some of them, view the same
words as having the potential of permitting the federal authorities to
trench on their legislative competence under the constitution in
terms of the enactment of federal legislation for purposes of
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treaty-implementation. The situation is similar but not the same as
the Canadian constitutional problems. Until recently they did not
have a Labour Conventions case to settle in a definitive manner the
reach of the federal treaty-implementation power.
They now have one but in a sense it is inconclusive. I refer to
Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen decided by the High Court in 1982. 33
Australia had ratified the International Covenant on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on August 13, 1980. To
implement this treaty the federal Parliament had passed the Racial
Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth). The plaintiff supported, and the
State of Queensland attacked, the validity of this legislation on the
ground that some of the provisions were beyond the reach of the
federal power to enact laws with respect to external affairs under
section 51 (XXIX) of the federal constitution.
The High Court, in a 4:3 decision, upheld the provisions of the
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 as a valid exercise of the power of
the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to external affairs.
This power had never been definitively settled by the High Court.
Three of the majority judges, Mason, Murphy and Brennan JJ., held
that the Commonwealth Parliament can give legislative effect to any
international agreement entered into bona fide by the Common-
wealth, whatever its content and in doing so may override state law.
In addressing this view Chief Justice Gibbs and Aickin J. said:
If the view... is correct, the executive could, by making an
agreement, formal or informal, with another country, arrogate to
the Parliament power to make laws on any subject whatsoever. It
could, for example, by making an appropriate treaty, obtain for
the Parliament powers to control education, to regulate the use of
land, to fix the conditions of trading and employment, to censor
the press, or to determine the basis of criminal responsibility - it
is impossible to envisage any area of power which could not
become the subject of Commonwealth legislation if the
Commonwealth became a party to an appropriate international
agreement. In other words, if s. 51 (XXIX) empowers the
Parliament to legislate to give effect to every international
agreement which the executive may choose to make, the
Commonwealth would be able to acquire unlimited legislative
power. The distribution of powers made by the Constitution
could in time be completely obliterated; there would be no field
33. (1982), 56 A.L.J.R. 625. For an earlier case on the reach of "the external
affairs" power under s. 51 (XXIX) of the Australian Constitution seeR. v. Burgess
ex. p. Harry (1936), 55 C.L.R. 608.
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of power which the Commonwealth could not invade, and the
federal balance achieved by the Constitution could be entirely
destroyed. 34
Wilson, J., the third dissenting judge, put the matter equally
forcefully:
. . .if ss. 9 and 12 of the [Racial Discrimination] Act [(Cth.)] are
a valid exercise of the power to enact laws with respect to
external affairs, it would be difficult to deny a power to
implement any international obligation. Certainly the entire field
of human rights and fundamental freedoms would come within
the reach of paramount Commonwealth legislative power ...
The effect. . .would be to transfer to the Commonwealth
virtually unlimited power in almost every conceivable aspect of
life in Australia, including health and hospitals, the workplace,
law and order, the economy, education, and recreational and
cultural activity .... So broad a power, if exercised, may leave
the existence of the States as constitutional units intact but it
would deny them any significant legislative role in the
federation. 35
Stephen, J., the swing judge, voted to constitute a majority of the
judges in upholding the impugned federal legislation. He pointed
out, however, that the Commonwealth head of power under s. 51
(XXIX) is not "treaties" but "external affairs" and then made the
following reservation:
But where the grant of power is with respect to "external affairs"
an examination of subject-matter, circumstance and parties will
be relevant whenever a purported exercise of such power is
challenged. It will not be enough that the challenged law gives
effect to treaty obligations. A treaty with another country,
whether or not the result of a collusive arrangement, which is on
a topic neither of especial concern to the relationship between
Australia and that other country nor of general international
concern will not be likely to survive that scrutiny. 36
It would be impertinent to suggest that if Koowarta v.
Bjelke-Petersen had been decided early in 1980 instead of 1982 the
Australian opposition to the 1972 version of the federal state clause
would have been dissipated. There can be no doubt that the case
profoundly affects the distribution of legislative power between the
States and the Commonwealth of Australia. But it would appear that
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In commenting on the implications of the Koowarta case, Dr. J.
M. Finnis has written:
At all events, the States can still argue that no positive
interpretation of the external affairs power commanded a
majority in Koowarta, and that the rulings or dicta on human
rights in general are not definitive, and not to be acquiesced in.
Moreover, the States can still contend, at the political and
administrative level, that since a majority of Justices have clearly
ruled that not every treaty will attract the external affairs power,
the arrangements (since 1976) for regular Commonwealth-State
consultations on the negotiation of treaties are more important
than ever. Koowarta provides no proper ground for the
Commonwealth to try to scale those consultations down.
Nor does Koowarta provide any genuine ground for Australia to
slacken its efforts to obtain 'federal state' clauses in international
treaties. 3
7
Because of the Australian concerns at the time, Article 41 was
inserted in the 1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction in the
following terms:
Where a Contracting State has a system of government under
which executive, judicial and legislative powers are distributed
between central and other authorities within that State, its
signature or ratification, acceptance or approval of, or accession
to this Convention, or its making of any declaration in terms of
Article 40 shall carry no implication as to the internal distribution
of powers within that State.
Canada abstained from voting for or against the motion to adopt
but contented itself in explaining its vote to state that this clause
appeared to be a matter to be sorted out internally in Australia and
not one for insertion in an international convention. But I am under
no illusions and though together we appear to have scotched the
snake, we have, I suspect, not killed it. I hope that in the future
better minds may find a solution which will allow Australia and
ourselves to live comfortably in the international community. But
whatever the solution proposed and unless and until the
treaty-making power in Canada is changed, we must not allow
ourselves to be driven off the formula that is a sine qua non for us in
our ventures into the international field and which is acceptable to
our colleagues in other contracting states. The matter is legally
37. Finnis, Power to enforce treaties in Australia - the High Court goes
centralist? (1983), 3 Oxford J. Legal Stud., 126 at 128 et seq.
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critical for us. It is obviously important for the Australians as well.
It is distressing that we should be so obviously at odds with them
and unseemly that the debate should be so public and so protracted.
I imagine it is small comfort to them that their chief support in these
forums has been the U.S.S.R. who, curiously enough, express an
abhorrence for all these so-called colonial clauses. Thus do
technical terms acquire an opprobrious connotation. 3
There are other possible formulations for the federal state clause,
such as that contained in Article 41 of the 1951 United Nations
Convention on the Status of Refugees. The provisions read as
follows:
Art. 41. In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State the
following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come
within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative
authority, the obligations of the Federal Government shall to this
extent be the same as those of Parties which are not Federal
States;
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come
within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces
or cantons which are not, under the constitutional system of the
Federation, bound to take legislative action, the Federal
Government shall bring such articles with a favourable
recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of
states, provinces or cantons at the earliest possible moment;
(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request
of any other Contracting State transmitted through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, supply a statement of
the law and practice of the Federation and its constituent units in
regard to any particular provision of the Convention showing the
extent to which effect has been given to that provision by
legislative or other action. 39
This type of clause is common in the I.L.O. Conventions and the
United Nations Conventions. Clearly they attempt to deal with the
problems of contracting states having an internal organization with
divided legislative jurisdiction in the particular subject matter of the
38. Since the date of writing, word has come that the Tasmania Dam case has been
disposed of by the High Court favourable to the Commonwealth and in a manner
which now settles the reach of the federal treaty-making and treaty-implementing
power under the Commonwealth Constitution. It has also been suggested that in
view of this decision any special federal state clause for Australia will no longer be
required.
39. SeeU.N. Treaty Series, vol. 189, 137 at 180.
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treaty. They are generally unpopular with contracting states having
a unitary system and have not been acceptable in the Conventions of
The Hague Conference dealing essentially with private law
subjects .40
The Federal State Interpretation Clauses
Earlier in this address I alluded to the fact that there is not one
federal state ratification clause but a number of them. Three of them
have been discussed at length. We now turn to a brief discussion of
federal state interpretation clauses. In a sense that is a misnomer but
it does classify those types of clauses that are necessary in any
convention applying to a state which has a non-unified legal system.
It may, of course, be a federal state properly so called but it is also
necessary in those politically unitary states having more than one
legal system. These clauses are interpretive or definitional in nature
and are essential for a proper application of the convention. For
example, The Hague Convention on Recognition of Divorce and
Legal Separation in Article 23 contains a federal state ratification
clause which provides that if a contracting state has more than one
legal system in matters of divorce or legal separation it may, at the
time of signature, ratification or accession declare that the
convention shall extend to all its legal systems or only to one or
more of them, and may modify its declaration by submitting another
declaration at any time thereafter.
The corresponding federal state interpretation clause is found in
Article 15 of the Convention and states that in relation to a
contracting state having, in matters of divorce or legal separation,
two or more legal systems applicable to different categories of
persons, any reference to the law of that state shall be construed as
referring to the legal system specified by the law of that state. This
clearly applies in states such as Israel where the divorce laws differ
in relation to religious groups within the state, i.e. one divorce law
for those of the Jewish faith and a different divorce law for those of
the Moslem persuasion.
These interpretation clauses are particularly relevant in the
context of The Hague Conference conventions since the connecting
factors in private international law, such as habitual residence, are
40. See Bernier, op. cit., 172 et seq. for a full analysis of this type of federal state
clause.
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relevant not to the national state but to the territorial units of that
state. We, in Canada, are entirely familiar with the fact that with
respect to the formulation of rules designed to resolve conflict of
laws the Canadian provinces are treated as separate countries or
jurisdictions. The Hague Conventions reflect that fact. For
example, the 1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction in Article
31 provides that:
In relation to a State which in matters of custody of children has
two or more systems of law applicable in different territorial
units -
a) any reference to habitual residence in that State shall be
construed as referring to habitual residence in a territorial unit of
that State;
b) any reference to the law of the State of habitual residence
shall be construed as referring to the law of the territorial unit in
that State where the child habitually resides.
Diversity of laws or legal systems may, as we have seen, result
from territorial unit legislative competence in a true federal state or
from differing legal treatment of peoples on religious grounds in a
unitary state such as Israel. It may also result from different laws
applicable to different groups within an otherwise unitary state
based upon differences in ethnic origin. This is true of states such as
Yugoslavia, a member of The Hague Conference on Private
International Law. In that country different laws in relation to
matrimonial property apply to the distinct ethnic groups, Croats,
Slovenes, Serbs, etc., of which the nation is composed.
Consequently the 1978 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to
Matrimonial Property Regimes in Article 19 contains the provision
that:
For the purposes of the Convention, where a State has two or
more legal systems applicable to the matrimonial property
regimes of different categories of persons, any reference to the
law of such State shall be construed as referring to the system
determined by the rules in force in that State.
It has always intrigued me that legal constructs which
superficially appear so disarmingly simple turn out to be highly
complex in application. This is a source for great challenge to the
lawyer. A good illustration of this is found in the area of conflict of
laws or private international law with its frequent reference to
nationality as a connecting factor. The reference to nationality and
national law in the Convention on Matrimonial Property Regimes
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raised special problems for the United Kingdom. The status of
British subject in their nationality law as it existed at that time
would have caused special problems in the application of that
Convention. It was common ground that large numbers of British
subjects could not be said to be British nationals for the purposes of
the applicability of the Convention. Consequently the United
Kingdom was instrumental in having a special interpretive clause
inserted as Article 26 which provides:
A Contracting State having at the date of entry into force of the
Convention for that State a complex system of national allegiance
may specify from time to time by declaration how a reference to
its national law shall be construed for the purposes of the
Convention.
This appears to be an acceptable solution to a very complicated
problem and the stuff of which law and human relations is all about.
One must not assume that this is the ultimate end of the
development of federal state clauses in the area of international
conventions and treaties. But, at least, it is the end of a long
beginning. What has been accomplished in the last decade reflects a
rational approach and has laid a sound foundation for future
development. In my view, Canadians can be justly proud of their
contribution to this important area of international legal scholarship
and cooperation.
Throughout his professional life, Dr. Read willingly and eagerly
took up the challenges offered by some of the most conceptually
complex areas of the law governing nations and the relations of
human beings. He did this not for personal gain or recognition but to
assist in the fashioning of a more just and enduring society for all.
His life and his work have inspired others to do likewise. May I end,
as I began, that it has been a great privilege to be with you on this
occasion.
